Suchergebnisse

Liberalism in crisis -- Liberalism and ethics -- Liberalism's past and precedents -- Why individual rights? : rights as metanormative principles -- The natural right to private property -- Individualistic perfectionism -- Defending individualistic perfectionism -- Natural law and the common good -- Self-ownership -- Communitarian and conservative critics -- The structure of the argument for individual rights -- Defending individualistic non-perfectionist politics -- Epilogue : from metanorms to metaphysics

In this essay, I consider whether the alleged demise of metaphysical realism does actually provide a better way for defending the cognitive status of ethical judgments. I argue that the rejection of a realist ontology and epistemology does not help to establish the claim that ethical knowledge is possible. More specifically, I argue that Hilary Putnam's argument does not succeed in making a case for ethical knowledge. In fact, his account of the procedures by which our valuations are warranted—the criteria of idealized inquiry—ultimately begs the question in a number of crucial ways. Moreover, it prejudices the moral and political discussion in certain ideological respects. Finally, though Putnam has apparently modified to some extent his approach to the issue of realism in recent years, I will point out that these modifications are not fundamental and do not help to advance the case for ethical knowledge. I note also that Martha C. Nussbaum's appeal to Putnam's argument actually works against her attempt to make a case for an Aristotelian conception of human flourishing. Ultimately, I conclude that metaphysical realism is vital for ethical knowledge.

If "perfectionism" in ethics refers to those normative theories that treat the fulfillment or realization of human nature as central to an account of both goodness and moral obligation, in what sense is "human flourishing" a perfectionist notion? How much of what we take "human flourishing" to signify is the result of our understanding of human nature? Is the content of this concept simply read off an examination of our nature? Is there no place for diversity and individuality? Is the belief that the content of such a normative concept can be determined by an appeal to human nature merely the result of epistemological naiveté? What is the exact character of the connection between human flourishing and human nature?These questions are the ultimate concern of this essay, but to appreciate the answers that will be offered it is necessary to understand what is meant by "human flourishing." "Human flourishing" is a relatively recent term in ethics. It seems to have developed in the last two decades because the traditional translation of the Greek term eudaimonia as "happiness" failed to communicate clearly thateudaimoniawas an objective good, not merely a subjective good.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Whence Natural Rights? -- 1 What's Wrong with Natural Rights? -- 2 Problems with the Non-aggression Principle? -- 3 Why the Reluctance to Appeal to Natural Rights? -- Chapter 2: How to Understand and Justify Individual Rights: A Synopsis -- 1 Rights as a Moral Concept -- Liberty as a Moral Notion -- Understanding the Role of Rights -- Individualistic Perfectionism -- Why We Have Rights -- A Realist Basis for Rejection of Equinormativity -- 2 The Primacy of Rights in Political Philosophy -- The Virtue of Justice and Metanorms -- Three Senses of Justice -- Social Justice and Natural Endowments -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: On Principle -- 1 Rights, Principles, and Practicality -- Understanding the Context for Side-Constraints -- The Range of Applicability of Individual Rights -- On Being Practical -- Ideals and Principles -- Conflicting Principles -- 2 Natural Rights as Principles -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Objections to Natural Rights and Replies -- 1 Some Preliminary Objections -- Natural Rights do not Precede Their Implementation -- Natural Rights are Over-Individualized -- Natural Rights are Basically a Matter of Power -- Natural Rights are Neither Primary Nor Sufficiently Obligatory -- 2 A Basic Metaethical Objection -- Natural Rights and the "Naturalistic Fallacy" -- The Alleged Naturalistic Fallacy -- Deeper Ontological and Epistemological Issues -- Natural Rights are Grounded in Controversial Metaphysics -- 3 Impracticality Objections -- The Irrelevance of Natural Rights -- Natural Rights Fail to Guide -- The Absoluteness of Natural Rights -- The Impotency of Natural Rights -- 4 Natural Rights and the "Human Nature Problem" -- The Failure of Inclusivity in Natural Rights -- The Problematic Concept of Human Nature -- Chapter 5: Segue -- 1 MacIntyre, Rights, and Tradition.

"Contemporary political philosophy - especially in the works of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen - has assumed that it can separate itself off from other philosophical positions and frameworks. In this book, Den Uyl and Rasmussen challenge this trend by moving from the liberalism they advocate in their earlier work to what they call "individualistic perfectionism" in ethics. They continue to challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory by filling in the nature of the perfectionist ethical approach utilised in their previous political theorising. By developing the central features and principles of individualistic perfectionism they show that it is a major and powerful alternative to much contemporary ethical thinking - particularly to constructivism - and that it is capable of overcoming standard objections to perfectionism"--Back cover

Abstract
It is more than clear that in our previous works—Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn—we are opposing what is generally understood as egalitarianism in political philosophy. Our purpose here is to clarify our opposition by showing that our rejection of egalitarianism cannot be successfully accused of being inconsistent with morality itself. We believe that discussing what we call "two dogmas of egalitarianism" will go some distance in accomplishing that end. These "dogmas" can be stated as follows: (1) The burden of proof for any deviation from equality in ethics rests upon the advocate of inequality; and (2) One's position on the natural equality (or inequality) of human beings requires a similar position in one's ethical conclusions.

A review essay on a book by Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2009).

AbstractThis essay asks whether what is good for someone is distinct from her self-perfection, and whether it makes sense to understand either her good or her self-perfection in terms of the other. The essay adopts a traditional naturalistic understanding of perfection. It argues, however, that the conception of human nature that underlies the perfectionist view must be more individualistic than it is often taken to be. It goes on to distinguish individuative from generic features of human nature; because the account includes both types of characteristics, the concluding vision of human nature, and hence human perfection, is deeply individualized. What is good for an individual is linked to the exercise of her nature rather than to desires individuals simply happen to have.

Abstract
Although it is necessary for the truth of a cognition that the cognition answer to the thing known, still it is not necessary that the mode of the thing known be the same as the mode of its cognition.
—Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, II, 75
The only safe way to apply Kant's test of universalizability is to envisage the act in its whole concrete particularity.
—Sir David Ross, Kant's Ethical Theory